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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
 
MOTOR VEHICLE ADMIN. V. DEERING: A DRIVER WHOSE 
LICENSE IS SUSPENDED UNDER THE “IMPLIED CONSENT, 
ADMINISTRATIVE PER SE LAW” IS NOT ENTITLED TO 
CONSULT WITH AN ATTORNEY BEFORE DECIDING 
WHETHER TO TAKE A BREATH TEST. 
 
By: Patrick Toohey 
 
     The Court of Appeals of Maryland held the implied consent, 
administrative per se law (“administrative per se law”) does not require that a 
suspected drunk driver be given the opportunity to consult an attorney before 
deciding whether to take a breath test.  Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Deering, 438 
Md. 611, 637, 92 A.3d 495, 511 (2014).  The court found that the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution does not establish a pre-test right to counsel for a suspected 
drunk driver in an administrative proceeding.  Id. at 635-37, 92 A.3d at 510-
11.   
     On May 3, 2012, Wicomico County police stopped April Marie Deering 
(“Deering”) for driving her car without dimming the high beams and having 
an expired registration tag.  After detecting the smell of alcohol and slurred 
speech, the officer asked Deering to complete a series of field sobriety tests.  
Failing to adequately complete the roadside tests, Deering was arrested for 
driving under the influence of alcohol.  At the police station, the officer read 
Deering the “DR-15 Form.”  The form advised her of the options and 
potential consequences of declining to take the breath test and adverse test 
results.  Deering asked for an opportunity to call her attorney before deciding 
whether to take the breath test.  The officer denied Deering’s request because 
of statutory time constraints that require the breath test to be administered 
within two hours of the arrest.  Deering subsequently agreed to take the test, 
which indicated a blood alcohol concentration of 0.16.  In accordance with 
the statute, Deering was issued a nintey day driver’s license suspension 
order.  
     Deering requested an administrative review of the suspension order.  The 
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) upheld the suspension, concluding that 
the denial of Deering’s request to consult an attorney did not violate her due 
process rights because the officer had adequately advised her of potential 
sanctions.  Furthermore, the opportunity to call a lawyer is not required in an 
administrative context.  
     Deering sought judicial review in the Circuit Court for Somerset County, 
which reversed the ALJ’s decision.  The circuit court held that the denial of 
Deering’s request to contact her attorney violated her due process right. The 
Court of Appeals of Maryland granted the Motor Vehicle Administration’s 
petition for certiorari.  
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     Under the administrative per se law, a driver has two options upon being 
detained.  The driver may (1) refuse the breath test and receive an automatic 
statutory suspension or (2) take the breath test, which could result in no 
suspension or a substantial suspension with the potential for criminal 
prosecution.  Deering, 438 Md. at 613, 92 A.3d at 496-97.  The Court of 
Appeals of Maryland sought to determine whether a detained driver, who is 
denied a pre-test opportunity to consult with counsel, is entitled to have the 
sanctions set aside as a violation of due process.  Id. at 613, 92 A.3d at 497.   
     The court began its analysis by examining due process in an 
administrative context.  Deering, 438 Md. at 622, 92 A.3d at 502.  In an 
administrative proceeding, courts apply a balancing test by considering 
“private interests, governmental interests, and the risk that the procedures 
will lead to erroneous decisions.”  Id. (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 
319, 334-35 (1976)).  The administrative per se law is designed to protect an 
individual’s private interest to drive, the public’s interest in deterring drunk 
driving, as well as encouraging cooperation with the breath test to measure 
impairment.  Id. at 623, 92 A.3d at 502.  The court articulated that in a purely 
administrative context, due process does not require a right to a pre-test 
consultation with an attorney.  Id. at 624, 92 A.3d at 503.  However, because 
a detained driver also faces potential criminal prosecution, the driver may be 
afforded greater protection. Id. 
     In the criminal context, the court has previously held that a detained 
driver has the limited right to a pre-test consultation with an attorney under 
the due process clause of both the Fourteenth Amendment and Article 24 of 
the Maryland Declaration of Rights.  Deering, 438 Md. at 625, 92 A.3d at 
504 (citing Sites v. State, 300 Md. 702, 717-18, 481 A.2d 192, 199 (1984)).  
Subsequently, state and federal courts have not held that the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment establishes a pre-test right to counsel 
for a suspected drunk driver.  Deering, 438 Md. at 628, 92 A.3d at 506; see 
e.g., State v. Degnan, 305 S.C. 369 (1991); Brank v. State, 528 A.2d 1185 
(Del. 1987).  The United States Supreme Court has also cast doubt on the 
right to a pre-test consultation.  Deering, 438 Md. at 630, 92 A.3d at 506-07 
(citing Nyloft v. Minnesota Comm’r of Public Safety, 474 U.S. 1027 (1985)).  
Some state courts, however, have recognized this limited right in a criminal 
proceeding, citing state constitutional provisions, rules, and statutes.  
Deering, 438 Md. at 631-32, 92 A.3d at 507-08; see e.g., State v. Spencer, 
750 P.2d 147 (1988); Copelin v. State, 659 P.2d 1206 (Alaska 1983).  The 
court’s ultimate inquiry rested on whether the pre-test right to counsel has an 
effect on the imposition of an suspension under the administrative per se law.  
Deering, 438 Md. at 631-32. 
     The court recognized that the Maryland General Assembly has made a 
cognizable effort to separate criminal and administrative proceedings that 
result from a suspected drunk driving incident.  Deering, 438 Md. at 633, 92 
A.3d at 508 (citing Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Richards, 356 Md. 356, 366, 
739 A.2d 58 (1999)).  Evidence that is excluded in a criminal proceeding 
may still be introduced in an administrative suspension proceeding, given the 
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minimal deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule in administrative 
proceedings. Deering, 438 Md. at 633, 92 A.3d at 508 (citing Richards, 356 
Md. at 371, 739 A.2d 58)).  
     Ultimately, the court declined to extend the right to a pre-test consultation 
to administrative proceedings.  Deering, 438 Md. at 635, 92 A.3d at 509-10 
(citing Najafi v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 418 Md. 164, 12 A.3d 1255 (2011)).  
In dicta, the court in Najafi explained that even if any such right did exist for 
the purposes of an administrative proceeding, due process protection would 
be satisfied by proper disclosure of the DR-15 form and a reasonable effort 
by an officer to accommodate a request to consult an attorney. Deering, 438 
Md. at 635, 92 A.3d at 509-10 (citing Najafi, 418 Md. at 184, 12 A.2d at 
1255)).  
     The court of appeals in Deering upheld the ALJ’s suspension of 
Deering’s license, concluding that an opportunity to consult a lawyer is not 
required in an administrative context. Deering, 438 Md. at 637, 92 A.3d at 
511.  The court focused on the legislative intent in the administrative per se 
law to ensure widespread safety of the public, combined with the interest in 
obtaining a timely and accurate measurement of impairment.  Id.  As a result, 
Deering was not entitled to have her license suspension set aside on the 
grounds that she was denied an opportunity to consult an attorney.  Id.  
     In Deering, the Court of Appeals of Marylandy emphasized its support of 
the separation between criminal and administrative proceedings.  The court 
found a lack of right to counsel in the initial stages of a suspected drunk 
driving incident.  The risk that the procedure may produce erroneous 
decisions is outweighed by society’s interest against drunk driving.  
Practitioners should be aware of individual’s rights overlapping between 
different court proceedings, specifically administrative and criminal, in 
drunk driving incidents. 
 
